

Message Text

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PAGE 01 SINGAP 03653 061313Z

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ACTION SS-30

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R 061020Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1178

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USUN NEW YORK 0106

S E C R E T SINGAPORE 3653

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CB, SN

SUBJ: KHMER ISSUE IN UNGA

REF: STATE 192437

1. DCM AND I MET WITH PERMSEC MFA BOGAARS AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS LEE CHIONG GIAM (WHO RECENTLY SERVED IN PHNOM PENH) ON SEPTEMBER 6 TO REVIEW FORTHCOMING UNGA AND NUMBER OF OTHER MATTERS. DRAWING ON REFTEL I USED OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS SECRETARY'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN THIS ISSUE, OUR STRONG FEELING THAT NO COUNTRY SHOULD VOTE TO EXCLUDE A DELEGATION IN GOOD STANDING FROM THE UN AND OUR SUPPORT FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION WHICH COULD LEAD TO PEACE OR AT LEAST THE DEFERRED OF THE ISSUE. BOGAARS CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAD HEARD FROM OTHER MFA AND INDONESIAN SOURCES THAT ASEAN INCLUDING GOS WOULD SUPPORT SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION PROPOSING EITHER A FACT-FINDING COMMISSION OR SOME OTHER FORMULA WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY POSTPONE THE ISSUE FOR

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SINGAP 03653 061313Z

ANOTHER YEAR. HOWEVER, HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT

IF THIS EFFORT WERE DEFEATED AND /OR THE QUESTION OF THE ACTUAL SEATING OF GRUNK CAME TO A VOTE, GOS WOULD VERY PROBABLY ABSTAIN.

2. ALTHOUGH WE PUT FORTH THE WHOLE GAMUT OF REASONS SET FORTH REFTEL AND PREVIOUS TELS AS TO WHY GKR SHOULD BE SUPPORTED DOWN THE LINE ON BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTIONS, BOGAARS WOULD NOT BUDGE. HE PUT FORWARD FOLLOWING REASONS WHY GOS PLANNED TO ABSTAIN EFFORT TO POSTPONE ISSUE FAILED:

A. JAPANESE WERE VERY PESSIMISTIC THAT BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE VOTES WOULD GO AGAINST LON NOL GOVERNMENT. SINGAPORE WAS SMALL SEA COUNTRY AND SIMPLY COULD NOT AFFORD TO BE ON THE LOSING SIDE OF A SUBSTANTIVE VOTE ON THIS ISSUE.

B. ALTHOUGH MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA MIGHT HAVE IMPROVED SOMEWHAT, ALL THE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS WERE VERY PESSIMISTIC OVER LON NOL GOVERNMENT'S SURVIVAL CHANCES OVER THE LONG HAUL. IN SHORT, LON NOL WAS A LOSER.

C. DESPITE SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PERSONAL INTEREST IN PRO-LON NOL VOTE, SINGAPORE AND OTHER ASEAN GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT HELP BUT REMEMBER US REMARKABLE CHANGE OF POLICY ON CHINA AND WONDERED WHETHER US MIGHT NOT PULL A SIMILAR SWITCH ON CAMBODIA.

D. EVEN IF US CONTINUED TO SUPPORT CAMBODIA, ASEAN GOVERNMENTS FELT THIS SUPPORT LIKELY TO BE ONLY HALF-HEARTED.

3. WE COUNTERED THESE ARGUMENTS BUT WITH NO APPARENT EFFECT.

4. I HAVE SUPPLIED BOGAARS AND HIS STAFF OVER PAST TWO WEEKS WITH BACKGROUND PAPERS INCLUDING ONE ON MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND HAVE REVIEWED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SINGAP 03653 061313Z

RATIONALE FOR OUR POSITION SEVERAL TIMES WITH FONMIN RAJARATNAM AND BOGAARS OVER LAST FEW MONTHS. WHILE GOS SUPPORT FOR CURRENT EFFORT TO FIND A FORMULA TO POSTPONE THE ISSUE IS HELPFUL, IT IS CLEAR (IF BOGAARS IS TO BE BELIEVED) THAT THE DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN GKR HAS BEEN WAGING WITH OUR SUPPORT TO CONVINCE OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES HAS BORNE LITTLE FRUIT. IN FACT, BOGAARS COMMENTED

THAT GKR HAD REACHED THE UNFORTUNATE POSITION THAT THE MORE IT TRIED TO HELP ITSELF THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, THE GREATER THE SUSPICION OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT ITS CAUSE WAS DOOMED. BOGAARS BRUSHED ASIDE OUR ARGUMENTS THAT ANY CHANCE OF BRINGING ABOUT NEGOTIATED PEACE WOULD FAIL IF UN VOTED AGAINST LON NOL GOVERNMENT. ONLY ARGUMENT WHICH SEEMED TO MAKE ANY IMPRESSION WAS THAT ADVERSE UN VOTE WOULD WEAKEN PUBLIC SUPPORT IN US FOR POLICY OF CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT AND INTEREST IN SEA. HOWEVER, HE FLATLY CHALLENGED ME BY SAYING THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE, US AMBASSADORS IN SEA AND ELSEWHERE SHOULD BE OFFICIALLY INSTRUCTED TO TELL HOST GOVERNMENTS THAT IF UN VOTE FAILED, US POLICY TOWARD THE AREA WOULD BE ALTERED.

5. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH GOS IS COMMITTED TO GOING ALONG WITH CURRENT EFFORT TO DEVELOP A FORMULA TO POSTPONE THE ISSUE, IT IS CLEARLY DUBIOUS WHETHER THIS EFFORT WILL SUCCEED AND IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE UNLIKELY THAT IT WILL ENGAGE IN ACTIVE LOBBYING TO SUPPORT IT. HOWEVER, IF BOGAARS, WHO JUST CHAIRED ASEAN SECRETARIES GENERAL MEETING IN SINGAPORE, IS CORRECT, OTHER ASEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE ALSO GLOOMY AND PESSIMISTIC. FOR EXAMPLE, BOGAARS SAID HE WAS SURPRISED OVER EXTENT OF PHILIPPINE PESSIMISM OVER LON NOL'S CHANCES OF SURVIVING.

6. IF WE ARE TO REVERSE THIS ATTITUDE, BELIEVE WE MUST TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO PERSUADE THESE GOVERNMENTS THAT US IS STRONGLY BEHIND THEIR EFFORTS. CONSEQUENTLY, TO REINFORCE OUR REPRESENTATIONS IN ASEAN CAPITALS I SUGGEST SECRETARY GIVE SERIOUS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SINGAP 03653 061313Z

CONSIDERATION TO ADDRESSING PERSONAL LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF EACH OF THE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS OUTLINING: (A) REASONS WHY WE FEEL RESOLUTION CALLING FOR DEFERRAL OF ISSUE SHOULD BE ACTIVELY SUPPORTED AND RESOLUTION CALLING FOR SEATING OF GRUNK OPPOSED; AND (B) STRESSING THAT AN ADVERSE VOTE BY THE UN WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA BUT ALSO ON USG ABILITY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT OF OUR POLICIES AND INVOLVEMENT IN SEA.
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